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OtC 1 9 19~ 
IN THE SUPREME COuRT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS, INC., 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LOCAL UNION 976, JOINT 
COUNCIL 67, WESTERN 
CONFERENCE OF TEAM-
STERS, THE INTERNATION-
AL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, CHAUF-
FEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN 
AND HELPERS OF AMERI-
CA - A.F.L. - C.I.O., MILO 
B. RASH, CLARENCE LOTT 
and JOSEPH W. BALLEW, 
Defenoonts and Appellants. 
Case No. 8823 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT 
HANSON, BALDWIN and ALLEN 
WALTER L. BUD·GE 
Attorneys for Pl!aintiff 
and Respandent 
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REX J. HANSON 
ERNEST F. BALDWIN,JR. 
ARTHUR A. ALLEN, JR. 
WALTER L.BUDGE 
ROBERT W. BRANDT 
LAW OFFICES 
HANSON, BALDWIN &ALLEN 
520 CONTINENTAL B~NK BUILDING 
SALT LAKE GITY, UTAH 
TELEPHONE ELGIN 9-7611 
June 16, 1958 F \LED 
JUN 1 81958 
Mr. L. M. Cummings 
Clerk of the Supreme Court 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Re: Dairy Distributors ve. Local Union 976 et al 
Case No. 8823 
Dear ~tr. Cummings: 
In accordance with the permission granted by the Chief 
Justice during the oral argument on this case, we wish 
to make the follol~ing corrections on the respondent's 
brief by interlineation: 
On Page 4, after the word "unloaded'• on line 10, 
reading from the top of the page, the following 
should be inserted, "by Dorman's and myself and 
a couple of Dorman's boys." 
On Page 7 of the brief, four lines reading from 
the top, the word "August" should be changed to 
"October." 
Ver.y tru1y yours, 
HAWSOll ~ BALDWIN & ALLEN 
_e)~ 
R.JH•jh 
cc • C1a.--ae a.ek 
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LAW OFFICES 
HANSON, BALDWIN &ALLEN 
520 CONTINENTAL BANK BUILDING 
REX ..J, HANS.ON SALT 1~AKE G:rTY, UTAH 
ERNEST r. BALDWIN,..JR. 
ARTHUR A.ALLEN,..JR. 
WAI..TER L.BUDGE 
ROBERT W. BRANDT 
TELEPHONE ELGIN 9-7611 
July 7, 1958 
Hon. Rodger I. RoDdnougb 
Chief Juatioe aDd llellbera oE the Court 
SUpreme Court· ot Utah 
State C.ap1to1 at1ld1~ 
Salt Lake C1ty, Utah 
Honorable Judges: 
Re: Da1ey Distributors, IM .• 
Plaintit.t and Respondent 
-vs-
Local Union 976, et al, 
Defendants and Appella.nts 
case No. 8823 
~lith the Court • s indulgence and permission, we seelt to dra-v1 
the Court's attention to two matters concerning the briefa of the 
parties in this appeal. 
First:. E;x-ror :Ln reapond•nt t s (our) br:i.ef. By .:i.nadverta:noe 
the term Hresponoentsn appears in place of "'appellants" on the 
follo'l1ing pages: 
Page 36. second paragraph. line 2 1 1 and last line. 
Past ~~· line 8 from top of page. 
Pag , next to last line. 
Second: The following st.atement taken rro_ m app.ellants • reply 
to respondent's brief. At page 12 ot said brief appellants write: 
"Reapondent next appears to uae the CIIJBPbell Coal case 
and the f:rv1oe Trade Cba~f!Ml• oaae aa a weapon against 
appell.an·•· basedon tSeaaan.uaptlOn that the caobe 
Valley Dairy Aasociat~on was the primary employer and 
that the plaintiff. the Da~ry Distributors. Inc. was not 
a primary employer but waa a secondary company. The 
appell.aat baa adopted tbe view • as did the trial court • 
that a1noe OOatmer -• the •;-g; .. uaser. empl~er 
and ac'uaCErator .tar. R1.1iJ1_! __ wbioh proceaaed 
aDd U.na ed UMt itiei•• a UleM epeara•s.ona. 
alt~ oa1l7 UDder aepenw 1 ... 1 enl•S..•• -.re oOIIIPle~IJ' 1ntecra~ed and 1n~erdependeat. the~ ~a&&t be 
re~ •• • •111cl• opera,lon ror tbe purpose or tbe 
Taft Act." {~aels ldded) 
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We f1Dd a.tbtns in the reeord to eubatantiate any such 
declaration. We invite your appellan'a do o1te tbe testimony, page 
and volUM, \\POD w .. ieb . .._ -would · M17 t• ~· erftmett,_ ate. tement. 
Indeed, the reoord la ·•leull' ·tMt ._ __ ..,u&l7. 
Testiaol17 Ill U.J.D ~~ ahtlf8t 
A. 
Wba\ 1e )'our PI'Of•aien or OM"J)at.tent 
M:r preteuiea 1e oheeae· ~ and I MDIO a obeeae 
Plan •• _ (Tr. 8) 
.... 
~. At tbe present time do you have any connection ~.ri th the 
Cache Valley Dair;;"l!tena lH-aeociat1on? 
.~. I manage the chk1esi::; opex•ation; I manage ·t.;l'Hi; \'Jhole d~ilj 
operation. 
t.~. Hot'f long have you been so e1n:ployed by t~hii;;~nl as a manager 
o£ their cheese or dairy operation'? 
t~. I got a contt"act v1itb the Cache Valley Dail"~Y ;',.ssociation 
in October of 1941,. to process their milk into cheese, 
and other dairy products, on a percent;a.ge bnsis. 
'~:. Can you tell the Court and jury something o.bout wbat 
the Cache Valley Dairymens Association is., \'<rhat is it ir: 
ordinary terminology? 
A. The C8.cba Vall.ey Dairy Assoe~at1on is a group of farrnerc 
that formed wba't is fo:n.ul.ly .knOwn aa a co-op -ror the 
purpose or marketing the m1l.k that they produce on the 
ta:rras abd receive the highest pri.ce for the milk possible. 
(Tr. 8) 
* * * 
.. 
aDd on oro- exa•'•'~' 
A. Tbat !.a what 1;he oontraot read. (Tr. 41) 
* .. • 
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Hon. Rot!lser 1. MoDonoUSh 
Cb1et' 3Uit1ce and Members or the court 
Salt lake C1ey; tftab 
Pace (3) 
Arne Hanson te~tttie4: 
Q. In '8fJUr b~l·._~.·~~ GOftpaUon tOJt h!rr 
DS.atrlwtora •• ~~'• •111 .,..u tell ''ll• eou.rt 
and 3U%7' tbe manner 1ft Wh10b JOU kept the books for 
Dairy Distributors, what procedure was tollowed? 
A. We kept a complete ·•et of books. on all operations r4 
Dairy l)istribu.tora, led,;era and everJtb1ns;, and had 
an aUditor there eve17, qaartor· arMS 1•~'1¥ a etaMment 
was made· tor tax purpo&ee. (lfr. 64, 65) 
* * * 
... 
and on voir-due: 
t).. There is nothing in the~e books that ha.a to do with 
the Association up there? 
A. No sir. (Tr. 66) 
* * * 
1'his testimony and an abundance of other testimony or record 
shot1S that Gosancr was an imPl:S?YI! ot Cache Valley Da1rymens Association, 
and that Goesner tlas an iQCQt:RQra,!to~: and ~ ot Dairy Distributors. 
Inc. The truth ot the matter ia that deten«ants and appellants kna..1 
that such v1ere the tacts. Rosa Tboreeon testified: 
"During tbia meeting tor the :t1rst time the Union asked 
us to include tbe emplc.vees ot Dairy. D:istributora under 
a contract and I advi.sed them we oouldn•t include them 
in the same contract because 1n our op1.nJ.on tbere were 
two dUt'erent 001\P*Dlea and there would bave to be · two 
separate oontraota, aDd one <d them aaid that would be 
all riSh~ it we WG\lld agree to it 'bUt that the drivers 
bad to be covered w1tb contract to. t-1 (Tr. 186. 187) 
There ia no Juat11'1cati.on for appelJ.anto • bald statement that 
the tra1 court "•. dopted the view • * • tha't Goaaner • • • •• the ~ 
:J:H * • *or .IM&llif2:HP'·" ~ not onl¥ ~ppear•" to~ ~-•117 "i'\iOh . vi.ew" ~ ._.11Nn• ..._ don 8811 since 
tbe ~Dt ot tl'da ac1iJ.OD baa ------~ al~Jtaj,aed• aa tbe record 
llbowa. tbat Bdw1.D ao.~ waa u ~.. eapr ~-cache Vall.e7 
~ Aaaoeiat1ora. aDG tta•a 
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Hon. Hoogel"~ I. r~-!)Onougl·~ 
Chiet J\.UJtioc and 14t'lmbera or tho Court 
8alt Lake City, Utah 
Page (L~) 
tt.. The cache \talle~t Dairy Association ia a group ot 
ranters that tormed \c!{hat is tonually 1-::nown as ~ 
co-op tor the purpose of marlteting the milk that 
they produc(~ on tho tarm.s and l.~ecei ve the highest 
price tor the nlilk: possible. ( i:rr.. 8) 
cacl:le V::1lley Distributoro, Inc. lias not an o~ration, ttstraight 
linen or at all of t;hc Dair.}t-mena Association. 
{By Nir. Hanson). t~1ll you tell th~ court atxl ~Jury 
ttrho the officers eu1d stoeJ.-"Jloldel~s ot this corporation 
11erc? 
l'he stoeldlolderts t~rere ~tra. Go~sner, ~~ v;:!:l:e,; and nzy--
aelf and my non Ed'Vlin Juni :n: ~ and Delores., m:s daughter', 
and A nie ltannent! 
':ll1:.:; officers arc: I mn prosidcnt of thG corporation., 
rtro. Gossn~;,;:r, v:l.ce-pre:?lident, ~1r1d A,:r-n1e Hanz)on j.s 
£Jecrettn:;y"~,troa~1U .. l"er. 
, • Ncn1 * au I unf::icx'rJtand your tostil;;.ony,, (.;:Olnpany HtH3 
o~·gan1.zed :in l.95a and what was the cond1.t1.on of.", or 
l10'l.1 did yWl· bu~1ooas go f'rom tl1at t1tne on until about 
1955. the spring ot 1955? 
A • The business ~ms surprisingly successful. It started 
out small and natw~ally lie had enough cheese to eo to 
Ne\~ York, but t'le had equipment that ~"as not net<tt. t1e 
encountered our problems1 but l'le znade money on every 
trip l>1hieh enablad us to buy additional equipment and 
enlarge our operation., and .find sooo back hauls in New 
Yorlt and vicl.n.tty • and we to\U'ld a better marlcet £or 
those products every year out 1n this country. so it 
became a very successtu1. and a very pro£~tab1e oper-
at:1.on. (Tr. 13, 14) 
To say otherwise ia to be-Ue the record. 
, JHa1e 
, ... 
Reapecth.lly sWbi.tted. 
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STATE OF UTAH 
DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS, INC., 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LOCAL UNION 976, JOINT 
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STERS, THE INTERNATION-
AL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, CHAUF-
FEUR'S, WAREHOUSEMEN 
AND HELPERS OF AMERI-
CA - A.F.L. - C.I.O., MILO 
B. RASH, CLARENCE LOTT 
and JOSEPH W. BALLEW, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 8823 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT 
ST~TEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANTS WERE CLEARLY IN VIOLATION 
OF TITLE 29, SECTION 187, LABOR MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONS ACT AND MUST THEREFORE RESPOND 
IN DAMAGES AS THE ACT PROVIDES. 
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tributors ceased shipping to New York and the 
Cache Valley Dairymen's Association attempted 
thereafter to ship its cheese by common carrier, 
but this operation was interferred with because 
of ''ta:bor trouble'' at the cheese factory. Dairy Dis-
tributors shipped one more truckload of cheese in 
September, 1955, which was not unloaded because 
of union interference and which had to be placed 
in storage. In October, another load was shipped,· 
which was picketed but unloaded. Subsequent to 
October, 1955, Dairy Distributors made no further 
attempt to transport cheese to New York, their 
only profitable trucking operation, and began dis-
posing of their equipment. The termination of the 
trucking operation by the corporation was neither 
vo1untary nor optional They were forced into a 
position of incurring a risk too great to bear. With 
each individual load of cheese representing an in-
vestment of twelve thousand dollars ( $12,000.00), 
no smafl family corporation such as Dairy Distri-
butors could~ afford the danger of being stranded 
with such costly, highly perishable cargo at the 
farthest place in the nation from its home opera-
tion. 
'Thereafter, on June 29, 1956, suit was com-
menced. IThe jury returned its verdict in favor of 
the plaintiff and against the defendants, Local 
Union No. 976, Joint Council No. 67, the Western 
4 
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Conference of Teamsters, the International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and 
Helpers of America A.F.L.-C.I.O. and Joseph 
Ballew in the sum of $100,000.00 on October 29, 
1957. 
From the judgment on the verdict this appeal 
resu1ts. 
ST~TEMENT OF FACTS 
To the cause at bar the operation of the Cache 
Valley Dairy Association is merely incidental. We 
are here concerned with the damage done Dairy 
Distributors, Inc. by the wrongful acts of the defen-
dants in this independent corporation's conduct of 
its business. The fact that Edwin Gossner was em-
ployed by the Dairy Association and was also an 
incorporator and president of Dairy Distributors 
is not 1naterial although defendants' activities were 
directed against both the Association and Dairy 
Distributors, Inc. The facts cannot be in dispute. 
Dairy Distributors, Inc. was a separate corporate 
entity entirely set apart from the Cache Valley 
Dairying Association or any other business enter-
prise (Tr. 66); any contention of the defendants 
to the contrary notwithstanding. 
The incorporators and stockho1ders of Dairy 
Distributors, Inc. were Edwin Gossner, his wife, 
his son Edwin, Jr., his daughter Delores and one 
Arnie Hansen ( Tr. 13). These people formed this 
5 
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closed corporation in September of 1952 (Tr. 12) · 
The executive board of the Cache Valley Dairying 
Association had declined to go into the trucking 
business (Tr. 11). Dairy Distributors purchased 
the necessary motorized equipment and employed 
the necessary personnel to carry on the trucking 
operation ( Tr. 14-15). The net profit for the years 
1953, 1954 and the first half of 1955 averaged 
$1,000.00 per month CTr. 29). 
Dairy Distributors' principal source of income 
was from business transacted with Dorman and 
Company of New York City (Tr. 16). On or about 
July 2'7th of 19'55, Dorman advised Dairy Distri-
butors tha:t there was a picket line in front of the 
Dorman establishment and that Dorman employees 
would not cross the picket line and did not want 
to unload the cheese from Dairy Distributors' truck 
(Tr. 16). See Plaintiff's Exhibits 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 
11, 13, 14, and 15. The picketing signs read: 
NOTICE 
The Cheese Carried and Delivered 
By This Truck Has Been Worked 
Processed By 
NON-UNION 
EMPLOYEES 
of the Cache Valley Dairy-
Mens Assoc. Smithfield, Utah 
Teamsters Joint Council No. 67 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 13 (Emphasis added). 
6 
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From that time on Dairy Distributors' business 
was disrupted (Tr. 17); they made but two more 
shipments of cheese to New York, one in September 
and another in August. N orma1ly Dairy Distribu-
tors had tvvo trucks on the road steadily, one going 
east and one returning to the west ( Tr. 15). There 
had never previously been a dispute between Dairy 
Distributors, or the Dairy Distributors' employees, 
and the Teamsters Union ('Tr. 21, 22). The Union 
had attempted to secure recognition as the repre-
sentative of the employees of Cache Valley Dairy-
mens Association fTr. 22). On cross examination 
the witness Edwin Gossner was asked: 
Q. Have you made an effort to get in 
any other kind of business since October 1955 
if you employed this equipment? 
And thereafter the record shows : 
A. I was told by Rash they would pic-
ket every place we would go, it would be fi-
nancial suicide unless we find out about pic-
keting and secondary boycott. 
Q. The reason you went out of business 
was because of the picketing difficulties? 
A. The Dairy cheese picketing in New 
York. 
Q. The sole reason you went out of 
business was because you had serious labor 
difficulties? 
A. Dairy Distributors had no labor dif ... 
ficulties to my knowledge. 
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Q. Who did have the difficulties, why 
did you go out of business then? 
A. On account of the cheese couldn't be 
handled any more 'by Dairy Distributors. The 
employees didn't give me any trouble,- had 
no labor trouble. 
Q. The reason you did go out of busi-
ness was because of labor difficulties as I 
get it? 
A. Because of picketing. (Tr. 40). 
Arnie Hansen, bookeeper for Dairy Distribu-
tors, identified the corporation's books. He testified 
that the books of Dairy Distributors had nothing 
to do with the Cache VaHey Dairymens Association 
('Tr. 66). 
Paul B. Tanner, Certified Public Accountant, 
was auditor for Dairy Distributors (Tr. 68, 69). 
The corporation audits were admitted in evidence 
(Tr. 71). The books and audits show the corpora-
tion's operation to have been a profitable one. When 
the books were closed the assets were $56,131.00 
as against liabilities of $6,808.71 ( Tr. 224). 
Plaintiff called Milo Rash, the Secretary and 
'Treasurer of Local Union 976, and Trustee of Joint 
Council67 (Tr. 102). ·This witness, in company with 
the defendant Joseph W. BaTlew, an employee of 
the Western Council of Teamsters (Tr. 142), went 
to New York on or about May 31, 1955 to see Mr. 
Louie Dorman (Tr. 102). They there went to the 
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Local Union of which Dorman employees were mem-
bers and had the Secretary-Treasurer of that Union, 
a Mr. Ristuccia, cafl Dorman to the Union office 
(Tr. 103). The witness was evasive as to what took 
place at that meeting. (Tr. 103, 104). On July 26 
and 27, this witness picketed Dairy Distributors' 
truck at Dormans in New York City (Tr. 105-110) 
as did Clarence Lott (Tr. 234). Rash conversed 
with one Rosen, a member of the New York Local 
Union and a foreman of Dorman employees, at the 
time of the picketing (Tr. 111, 112). On cross 
examination this witness testified: 
A. Our purpose in going to New York 
was to talk to Mr. Dorman and try to get him 
to put pressure on Mr. Gossner with us and, 
of course, the question to cover the employees 
of Cache Valley. 
Q. Cache Valley Dairy? 
A. And also the truck driver, I asked 
several times they meet with us. (Tr. 114-
115). 
And, 
Q. When you went to New York, who 
was the duly organized bargaining agent for 
the employees? 
A. 976. (Tr. 115). 
However, on re-direct this witness admitted: 
Q. And at the time you went back to 
New York, is it your contention Number 976 
had been certified by the National Labor Re-
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lations Board as bargaining agent for those 
employees or not? 
A. We were recognized bargaining 
agent by his signed contract before. 
Q. Had you been certified by the N a-
tional Labor Relations Board when you went 
back to New York? 
A. It wasn't necessary. 
Q. Answer "yes" or "no" : Had you been 
certified by the N ationa:l Labor Relations 
Board when you went back to New York on 
May 31st, 1955? 
A. No. 
Q. And have you been certifed, your 
organization been certified as bargaining 
agent of the employees of the Dairy Distribu-
tors when you went back to New York on 
May 31st, 1955? 
A. The same answer, "no". 
Q. Have you ever had a contract with 
any of the employees of Dairy Distributors 
when you went back to New York in May 
of 1955? 
A. Before that? 
Q. With the employees of Dairy Dis-
tributors? 
A. Before 1955? 
Q. Yes? 
A. Some of the employees that drove 
Dairy Distributors trucks were Union mem-
bers before- in 1952. 
10 
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Q. That isn't what I asked you. 
I asked you whether you had a contract 
with Dairy Distributors before 1955, or at 
any time? 
A. No. We didn't know there was any 
difference between them and Cache Valley 
Dairy Association, then. (Tr. 118, 119). 
Local Union 976 of which the witness was 
Secretary-Treasurer was under a trusteeship and 
the trustee, John M. Annan of Los Angeles, Calif-
ornia, was appointed to that position by the Inter-
national Union (Tr. 121-123). On further re-direct 
examination and as to "Mr. Ballew" and the "Team-
sters" the witness stated: 
Q. Mr. Rash, did I understand you to 
say Mr. Ballew was sent here to Utah to 
assist you in your problem? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And he was - where did he come 
from? 
A. The office of the Western States 
Dairy Employees Council, it is at Seattle, 
Washington. 
Q. Is that a division of the Western 
Conference of 'Teamsters? 
A. It is not the Western Council of 
Teamsters, I don't believe. It is a separate 
division that the local Unions that have mem-
bers working in the dairy industry pay a per 
capita tax on the members, they have in the 
dairy industry, into Western States Dairy 
Employment Council. 
11 
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Q. Does Western Teamsters have other 
employees except Western dairies? 
A. It is a warehouse council, automo-
tive council, over the road council. 
Q. And do you have other councils of 
emp1oyees? 
A. There are other councils. 
Q. 'The Western Conference of Team-
zt·ers has jurisdiction over what States? 
A. Eleven states; the Western Council 
of 'Teamsters is comprised of Local Unions in 
the eleven western states. (Tr. 127). 
The deposition of Harry Rosen, employee of 
Dorman, was published (Tr. 130). He was a mem-
ber of Local 277 of the Teamsters in New York 
(Tr. 130). The testimony of this witness concerned 
itself with what took place on the morning of July 
26, 1955 when he and a "city loader" went to Dor-
mans to unload the Dairy Distributors truck ( Tr. 
130-140). (It was a rule of the Local Union that 
when a truck came from out of town it could not 
be unloaded unless the firm hired a man to help 
unload - a "city loader." ( Tr. 131) ) . ·This witness 
specifical'ly stated: 
A. As I said, I had no knowledge of 
anything like that happening until I got there 
that morning. I came there to work and knew 
nothing about anything happening at all. 
Q. All you did in substance and in fact 
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was, you saw the picket line there and you 
assumed that there was a labor controversy, 
and so you just did not participate in unload-
ing the truck? 
A. That isn't what I said. I say, when 
I saw the pickets, I asked them why they were 
there. We had no labor trouble at our place. 
'The gentleman told me that he had permis-
sion from our union to picket the place. Hear-
ing that, I refused to unload the truck. (Tr. 
138). 
Joseph W. Ballew, representative of the Wes-
tern States Dairy Employees Council, was caHed 
as a witness for the plaintiff. The witness was a 
traveling trouble shooter whose duties were to "as-
sist any local unions voluntarily associated with the 
Council when requested for assistance in negotia-
tion of contracts, dispute, or strike over employees' 
rights * * * ." (Tr. 142). Under this employment 
the witness trailed a Dairy Distributors' truck to 
New York and the Dormans (Tr. 144); taking with 
him picket signs (Tr. 145). The Dormans were 
anxious to cooperate so there would be no difficulty 
with their own employees (Tr. 146). The witness 
decided to picket because he felt this would be a 
more forceful method of persuasion than asking 
plaintiff to do what he would like him to do. (Tr. 
150). 
Frank Fredrico, driver for Dairy Distrrbutors, 
took a truck load of cheese to Dormans, arriving 
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September 7, 1955. He testified to the following oc-
currence: 
A. We pulled up to Dormans dock as 
usual at 6 :00 o'clock in the morning and 
Harry came down-
Q. Harry, was that Harry Rosen? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. He said, "What are you fellows do-
ing here?" 
Art was the senior truck driver and said, 
"We are here with the load of cheese." 
Harry said, "I can't unload you, you will 
have to wait until the Dormans get here." 
Q. What did you do after that? 
A. We waited for the Dormans, and the 
Dormans came down and said, "We will have 
to call the Union''. 
Q. To do what, sir? 
A. "Call the Union". 
And he called the Union and, I guess, 
he didn't get no result, so Art, the senior 
truck driver, asked Mr. Dorman if he could 
speak to the shop steward, and he said, 
''Sure''. 
He called the shop steward Harry, and 
Art asked them "Could you fellows unload 
the cheese?" 
Art said, "No, we can't, the Union won't 
let us." 
Q. What happened after that, sir? 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. We left and put the cheese in stor-
age. (Tr. 152). 
This driver took another load in to Dormans on 
October 31, 1955. The foHowing occurred: 
Q. What happened when you got to the 
Dorman docks October 31st? 
A. Just as I started to back in, this 
fellow rolled out a sign and started picketing, 
a colored man, I don't know his name. 
Q. Do you recall where he came from? 
A. No I don't. 
Q. Do you recall what he had on the 
sign when he came out and started picketing 
the truck? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. Was that truck subsequently un-
loaded? 
A. It was unloaded by Dormans and 
myself and a couple of the Dorman's boys. 
Q. Do you know whether or not there 
was any court proceeding going on in New 
York at that time concerning this matter? 
A. Yes, there was. ('Tr. 153). 
Arthur Gywellskog was the second driver on 
the Dairy Distributor truck that arrived at Dor-
mans on September 7, 1955. He corroborated the 
testimony of the preceding witness, Fredrico, as to 
the occurrances of that day. On cross examination 
this witness detailed the "back haul" operation of 
Dairy Distributors fTr. 156-168). 
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Jack Pearce, District Manager of Cache Val'ley 
Dairy Association, a witness for plaintiff, testified 
as to the Union activities directed against the Asso-
ciation in 'Southern Idaho (Tr. 42-47). 
Ross Thoresen, witness for the plaintiff, was 
a labor relations counsel employed by Cache Valley 
Dairy Association in 1952 (Tr. 177). He was never 
employed by Dairy Distributors (Tr. 177). The 
witness testified that in July of 1953 the Union 
suspended the employees of Cache Valley Dairy As-
sociation through an open letter written by Mr. 
Rash ('Tr. 180). The basis for the suspension was 
because they (the employees) did not fight for a 
contract the Union wanted (Tr. 180). After that 
the witness ceased to bargain with Mr. Rash (Tr. 
180). The witness testified on further direct exam-
ination as follows: 
Q. Directing your attention to October 
31st of 1955, were you in New York City at 
that time? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Whi1e you were there, did you have 
a conversation with Mr. Ballew? 
A. , Yes sir. 
Q. Or Mr. Rash? 
A. Not Mr. Rash, just Mr. Ballew. 
Q. Who was present at the time this 
conversation took place? 
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A. There may have been others, there 
could have been others, but my recollection 
is it was just Mr. Ballew and myself. 
Q. Where did the conversation take 
place? 
A. In the ·Courthouse there, I think it is 
the Federal Courthouse. 
Q. What did you say to him and what 
did he say to you? 
A. I think I asked him about the picket-
ing that ha:d taken place that morning at the 
Dormans, this was October 31st, and Mr. 
Ballew indicated to me that after - (Tr. 
312). 
* * * 
Q. (By Hanson) . Confine the con ver-
sa tion, Mr. Thoresen, to the actual picketing 
going on there if that was the subject of it. 
A. We were discussing the picketing, 
yes. 
Q. Go ahead. 
A. Mr. Ballew said they wou1d picket 
us whenever they felt like it. 
Q. Did he say where they would picket 
you? 
A. I don't remember he expressed any 
particular place they would picket us. 
Q. was that the sum and substance of 
the conversation? 
A. Yes. fTr. 184). 
The witness further testified as to a meeting 
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held at the Ben Lomond in Ogden, Utah on August 
10, 19'55. He stated that the Union had not at that 
time been certified as the bargaining agent for the 
employees of Cache Val1ey Dairy Association (Tr. 
215). Also: 
During this meeting for the first time 
the Union asked us to include the employees 
of Dairy Distributors under a contract and 
I advised them we couldn't include them in the 
same contract because in our opinion there 
were two different companies and there would 
have to be two spearate contracts, and one 
of them said that would be all right if we 
would agree to it but that the drivers had to 
be covered with contract too. To my recol-
lection in the three or four years I have been 
associated with the Union I never recall them 
having made that request to us before. (Tr. 
186, 187). 
Edwin Gossner was recalled as a witness for 
the plaintiff and testified as to the suitability of 
Dairy Distributors' equipment for the transporta-
tion of cheese (Tr. 203-209). 
Arnie Hansen was recalled on cross examina-
tion by the defendants with respect to Dairy Distri-
butors' books (Tr. 209-229). The testimony of this 
witness has been hereinabove referred to. 
First witness for the defense was one LeRoy 
Schenk. This witness drove the Dairy Distributors' 
truck which arrived at Dormans on July 26, 1955. 
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The witness testified as to the events surrounding 
the picketing and as to the unloading of the truck 
on July 27, 1955 (Tr. 233-246). There was testi-
mony of a conversation between this witness and 
Gossner in the latter's office sometime in April of 
1955 CTr. 239-240). This had to do with a cut-
down of expenses at that time by reduction of the 
number of drivers employed by Dairy Distributors 
(Tr. 241). 
Milo Rash having theretofore testified was 
called as a witness for the defense. iThis witness 
testified now as to his conversation with Pierce 
in Idaho; ( 2) as to the meeting at the Ben Lomond 
Hotel on August 10, 1955; (3) as to the proposed 
contract with Cache Valley Dairy Association (the 
witness admitted that this contract did not cover 
Dairy Distributors. (Tr. 252)); ( 4) as to the meet-
ing on December 6, 1955 in Mr. Thoresen's office 
with Mr. Skolnick of the National Labor Relations 
Board and others; ( 5) and, as to the May 31, 1955, 
and July, 1955 trips to New York, including the 
pick~ting activities ( Tr. 246-261). 
The defense published the deposition of Victor 
Dorman. The recorded testimony of this witness 
shows clearly that the object of the Union was the 
Cache Valley Dairy Association and that the pur-
pose of the picketing was to force that Association 
to negotiate with the Union (Tr. 264-301). With 
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reference to a meeting with Mr. Ristuccia in the 
latter's office in New York, the witness testified: 
Q. On the occasion about which you a~e 
testifying, when you talked to Mr. Rash In 
Mr. Ristuccia's office with your brother, 
what, if anything, was said about picketing 
your establishment? 
MR. BECK: I object to the form of the 
question. 
THE COUR'T: The objection is over-
ruled. 
A. They said they would picket our es-
taHlishmen t and they showed us a picket sign 
or a replica of a picket sign, I believe Mr. 
Rash actually wrote out what would be on a 
picket sign if we did not cooperate. 
At that time my brother asked them if 
that were legal, and his answer was that he 
would take his chances upon that. 
Q. By cooperation in getting Cache Val-
ley Dairy Association to comply, what did 
they mean, do you know? What did it mean 
to you when they said, will you cooperate? 
A. They would like them to join the 
union. ('Tr. 272). 
Joseph W. BaUew was recalled as a witness for 
the defense. 'The witness testified further as to his 
actions in beha1f of the Union both in New York 
and in Utah. It is clear from the reading of his 
testimony that the primary purpose of the Union 
was to renew their contract with the Cache Valley 
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Dairymens Association by any available means (Tr. 
302-321). The witness testified in part: 
Q. It is your contention, isn't it Mr. 
Ballew, you represented those employes at 
the Cache Valley Plant? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If you represented them why didn't 
you call them out in strike? 
A. I have been only involved in one 
strike in four and a half years. 
Q. That isn't the question. 
Why didn't you carl them out on strike 
if you represented them? 
A. You can't do things like that 
Q. Can't you call out strikes? 
A. Yes, but I don't advocate strikes. 
Q. You had one up there? 
A. Who? 
Q. You? 
A. Not me. 
Q. Do you know whether a strike was 
held up there? 
A. In 1952 I heard there was a strike. 
Q. Mr. Ballew, you were here among 
other things to help Mr. Rash and others deal 
with this situation in Cache Valley? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That would be one way to take care 
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of the things, call out a strike and close the 
plant down? 
A. ·That wasn't my intention. 
Q. You went to New York and had 
Dormans picket Gassner? 
A. That wasn't a strike. 
Q. I am not asking whether it was a 
strike, it is your method of handling your 
problem up there? 
A. You may consider it that, I don't. 
Q. And a primary strike against an 
emp1oyer is not one of the methods you at-
tempted? 
A. I have never done it. 
Q. Does your Union? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. You don't know whether the Team-
sters ever cal'l strikes against primary em-
ployers? 
A. Certainly they do. 
Q. 'That is what I thought -
You didn't attempt in 1955 to call Cache 
Valley Dairy out on strike, to get Mr. Gassner 
to do what you wanted? 
A. No. (Tr. 312-314). 
'The witness admitted that there were unfair 
h1bor charges against the Union in September of 
19'55 (Tr. 450). Because of such pending charges 
the Union could not ask for a representation elec-
tion. (Tr. 318). 
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LeRoy Schenk was recalled as a witness for 
the defendants (Tr. 321). The witness testified 
as to the condition of the cheese transported by 
Dairy Distributors upon arrival in New York -
he stated that over a period of near'ly four years, 
1952-1955, there were about a dozen tin1es he 
had complaints about the cheese being warm CTr. 
328). 
Clarence Lott, Secretary-Treasurer, Teamsters 
Local 983, of Pocate'llo, Idaho, witness for the de-
fense ( Tr. 329). By this witness the defense offered 
to show wages paid ~to employees in cheese factories 
operating in Idaho and northern Utah. The Court 
sustained plaintiff's dbjection to such testimony 
(Tr. 329-334). 
The deposition of Louis Dorman was published 
and the following excerpts therefrom read into 
the record: 
Q. Suppose a load of cheese showed up 
this afternoon at your docks from Smithfield, 
Utah, the Cache Valley plant, either by Dairy 
Distributors, common carrier truck, or rail, 
you would accept it, would you not? 
A. Yes sir. (Tr. 336..:337). 
That for ithe defendants; 'the following for the 
Plaintiff: 
A. Mr. Ristuccia called me in his of-
fice and there he introduced me to Mr. Rash 
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and Mr. Ballew and they laid the entire story 
before me, that Gossner was not cooperat~ng 
with them at their end and they would hke 
for us not to take cheese. 
Q. By "their end", you mean in Smith-
field, Utah? 
A. Yes, sir. Mr. Ballew and Mr. Rash 
and Mr. Ristuccia all joined in the conversa-
tion, pointing out to me why I shouldn't ac-
cept the cheese, and I explained to them that 
I certainly would be cooperative in this thing 
if it was of minor importance, but inasmuch 
as it was of so great importance to us, that 
we depended so much on it, I couldn't very 
well just lie down and refuse to take the 
cheese. 
Q. Did they then say that if you con-
tinue to receive cheese that they would picket 
your establishment? 
A. Yes, Mr. Ristuccia told me that 
there was some understanding between dif-
ferent loca:ls, and one tries to coopera;te with 
another. And he feels that he should cooper-
ate with this western local. And I would just 
have to refuse to take the cheese. 
I told him and explained that I wouldn't 
do that, I just couldn't take that lying down, 
and I had to have that and we would go 
through with it. 
Mr. Ristuccia told me that he would pic-
ket and showed me the sign of the picket, and 
we went and talked and talked, and we left 
it at that. 
Q. After that conversation occurred, 
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when this truck appeared then, you were pic-
keted, pickets appeared? 
A. Yes, sir. It was Mr. Rash by him-
self at first. (Tr. 3'37-338). 
ARGUMENT 
POIN'T I. 
DEFENDANTS WERE CLEARLY IN VIOLATION 
OF TITLE 29, SECTION 187, LABOR MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONS ACT AND MUST THEREFORE RESPOND 
IN DAMAGES AS THE ACT PROVIDES. 
Apperlants correctly assume that respondent 
relies upon Section 303 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act, more correctly designated as Title 
29, Section 187, U.S.C.A. which provides: 
"(a) It shall be unlawful, for the pur-
poses of this section only, in an industry or 
activity affecting commerce, for any labor 
organization to engage in, or to induce or en-
courage the employees of any employer to 
engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in 
the course of their emp'loyment to use, manu-
facure, process, transport, or otherwise handle 
or work on any goods, articles, materials, or 
·commodities or to perform any services, where 
an object thereof is-
" ('1) forcing or requiring any employ-
er or se1f-employed person to join any labor 
or employer organization or any employer or 
other person to cease using, selling, handling, 
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the 
products of any other producer, processor, or 
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with 
any other person; 
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" ( 2) forcing or requiring any other 
employer to recognize or bargain with a_ labor 
organization as the representativ~ of _his em-
ployees unless such labor organization has 
'been certified as the represen1tative of such 
employees under the provisions of section 159 
of this ti ~le; 
"(b) Whoever shall be injured in his 
business or property by reason or any viola-
tion of subsection (a) of this section may sue 
therefor in any district court of the United 
'States subject to the limitations and provi-
sions of section 185 of this title without re-
spect to the amount in controversy, or in any 
other court having the jurisdiction of the 
parties, and shall recover the damages by him 
sustained and the cost of the suit. June 23, 
1947, 3:17 p.m., E.D.T., c. 120, Title III, 
§ 303, 61 Stat. 158." 
Appellants admit in their brief the "pursuance 
of the object described" in (a) ( 1) above; deny the 
object proscribed in (a) ( 2) ; and, deny there was 
an "appeal by the Un'ion to induce to concerted ac-
tion a neutral employee." (Brief of Appellants, 46-
49). 
One activity which respondent contends was 
illegal on the part of appellants was to induce and 
encourage the employees of N. Dorman and Son to 
engage in a concerted refusal in the course of their 
emp~oyment to handle cheese received from Dairy 
Distributors, Inc. It is further contended by re-
spondent that this conduct and the resultant concert-
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ed refusal of Dorman's employees to handle cheese 
from Dairy Distr1butors was done with two objects 
or purposes which are specifically set forth in Title 
29, Section 187, U. S. C. A. 'The first of these is 
forcing any employer or other person to cease using, 
selling, handl'ing, transporting or otherwise dealing 
in the products of any other producer, processor or 
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any 
other person. Sec 187 (a) (1). That such was one 
of the precise reasons for appellants' conduct is 
made clear by the testimony of both wi:tnesses, Bal-
lew and Rash. 
Rash testified: 
Our purpose in going to New York was 
to talk to Mr. Dorman and try to get him :to 
put pressure on Mr. Gossner with us and, of 
course, the question to cover the employees of 
Cache Valley. (Tr. 114). 
Ballew testified: 
Q. The purpose in contacting Mr. Dor-
man was to prevail upon him to buy cheese 
from someone else other than Dairy Dis:tri-
butors or Cache Valley Dairy * * *? 
A. Yes, and we also ask if he could per-
suade Mr. Gossner to meet and bargain with 
us. 
Q. You had two points in view: One, 
to buy cheese at some other place and two, 
to meet Mr. Gossner and have him bargain 
with you? 
27 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
And, 
A. Yes sir. ('Tr. 143). 
* * * our purpose was to invoke the rela-
tionship of Mr. Dorman to get through to Mr. 
Gassner if he could meet with us and we also 
' . prevailed on Mr. Dorman, if that were Im-
possible, if he could duplicate his supply of 
that cheese from some other source. (Tr. 
302). 
The deposition of Victor Dorman shows: 
Q. Will you state whether any sugges-
tions were made* * *as to what you could do 
to get Cache Valley Dairy to coopera,te? 
A. They had suggested from the very 
start that we get our supplies elsewhere, look 
for another shipper. (Tr. 271, 272). 
The deposition of Louis Dorman shows: 
A. Mr. R'istuccia called me in his of-
fice and there he introduced me to Mr. Rash 
and Mr. Ballew and they laid the entire story 
before me, that Gassner was not cooperating 
with them at their end and they would like 
for us not to take cheese. 
Q. By "their end", you mean in Smith-
field, Utah? 
A. Yes, sir. Mr. Ballew and Mr. Rash 
and Mr. Ristuccia all joined in the conversa-
tion, pointing out to me why I shouldn't ac-
cept the cheese, and I explained to them that 
I certainly would be cooperative in this thing 
if it was of minor importance, but inasmuch 
as it was of so great importance to us, that 
we depended so much on it, I couldn't very 
well just lie down and refuse to take the 
cheese. (Tr. 337). 
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Appellants do not deny this object (to have 
Dorman cease doing business with Cache Valley 
Dairymens Association), but contend that the means 
used was lawful because the Union contacted only 
the two Dormans and one Harry Rosen Who said he 
was a "foreman" and that he "supervised" the load-
ing and unrloading of merchandise. Appellants con-
tend that Rosen as a "supervisor" was not an "em-
ployee" under the act. The act defines an "em-
ployee", Title 29, Sec. 152 (3) and a "supervisor", 
Title 29, Sec. 152 (11). 'There is no definition of 
a "foreman." Respondent respectfulily contends that 
something more than the record discloses would be 
necessary to classify Rosen as a "supervisor" with-
in the meaning of the act. It has been 'held: 
"'This chapter does not except foremen 
* * * ." N.L.R.B. v. Skinner and Kennedy Sta-
tionary Co., (C.C.A. 1940), 113 F. (2) 667. 
Respondent's cause, however, is not predicated 
upon the status of Rosen within the Act. 
Appellants inadvertently om'it from their 
statement of the case and from their argument the 
testimony of respondent's witnesses Fredrico and 
Gywellskog ( Tr. 151-171). These were the drivers 
on the Dairy Distributors, Inc. truck that trans-
po~ted the cheese to the Dormans in New York. 
Their testimony makes it crystal clear that Dor-
man's employees refused to unload the cheese and 
that these refusals extended in time from July 26, 
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1955, through September 7, 1955. Further, Victor 
Dorman told Gassner ~that: 
"Our employees don't want to unload 
any more Dairy Distributors' cheese, don't 
send any more with Dairy Distributors' 
trucks." ( Tr. 89) . 
'There was a concerted refusai on the part of 
Dorman's employees to handle Cache Valley Dairy 
Association cheese; and, the employees were induced 
by what? The picketing efforts of Rash and Bal-
lew, nothing else, because the Dormans wanted the 
cheese and had never told their employees not to 
unload it ( Tr. 272, 273). 
'The appellants must respond in damages to 
respondent for violation of Title 29, Section 187 
(a) (1) of the Act. 
'The second announced purpose of the appel-
lants was to force Gassner as Manager of Cache 
Valley Dairymens Association to recognize and bar-
gain With the Loca:l Union in Ogden as the repre-
sen ta tive of his employees ( Tr. 11-1) . This they 
could not lawfully do unless they had been certified 
as the representative of such employees under the 
provisions of Section 159 of the Act. (Title 29, Sec. 
187, (a) ( )3). Rash testified unequivocally that 
when he and Ballew went to New York on May 31, 
1955, Local Union 9'76 had not been certified by the 
National Labor Re1ations Board as representative 
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of the employees of Cache Valley Dairymens Asso-
ciation ('Tr. 118, 119). But, appel'lants argue, it was 
the Union's "understanding" that they represented 
the association employees. (Appellant's Brief 52-
57). This appellants contend even in spiite of the 
fact that the Union had suspended these very same 
em.ployees by an open letter in July of 1953 (Tr. 
180) and that for about two years thereafter the 
Union made no demands (Tr. 189). 
Appellants' contention is that the Un'ion did 
nothing violative of Section 187 (a) {2) of the Act 
because "* * * the Union enjoyed a position of simi-
lar standing to that of being certified * * * ." (Ap-
pellant's Brief, 58). The act itself, Section 187 
(a) ( 3), provides for no such excep:tion. It would 
be a strange rule of law if a Union which once upon 
a time represented a group of employees under a 
contract which 'had expired would be permitted to 
suspend those employees from the Union and be 
permitted to claim representation and "enjoy the 
status of the bargaining agent" solely because an 
employee, an employer or another Union had not 
petitioned for representation in accordance with 
Section 159 (C) {1) (A) and (B) for which ap-
pellants contend. For :the purpose of the picketing 
in New York, the Union clearly pointed out in their 
picket signs that the Cache Valley Da'irymens Asso-
ciation employees at Smithfield, Utah, were NON-
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UNION EMPLOYEES. Would the Union make 
these same employees fish for one purpose, fowl 
for another? 
Can these appellants, from the state of the 
record, successfully claim here and i(J;llege that a sub-
stantial number of Cache Valley Dairy Association 
employees wished to be represented for collective 
bargaining by Local 976 during the period of this 
controversy? If the answer to that question is "no", 
then the Union must respond in damages for a 
violation of Section 187 (a) (2) of the Act. 
Finally, under Point I of appellants' argument, 
they con tend : 
"Even if the picketing had induced Dor-
man's employees to engage in a concerted re-
fusal to handle the cheese, (as it did) defen-
dants claim their traditional right to picket 
an ambulatory situs of their dispute with 
Gassner* * *." (Appellants' Brief, p. 63, 64). 
'This argument appears to be fallacious for if 
appelilants can, as they say, violate the law with 
impunity, the law 'itself becomes a nul'lity. The law 
does not sanction picketing for an unlawful pur-
pose. Sloan v. Journal Publishing Company, (Ore. 
19'58) 324 P. (2) 449. 
In support of this final contention your appel-
lants cite N.L.R.B. v. International Rice llfilling Co., 
341 U.S. 665, 95 L. Ed. 1277, 71 S. Ct. 961. This 
case holds that where agents of a union who pic-
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keted a n1i'll encouraged two men in charge of a 
truck of a neutral customer of the mill to refuse, 
in the course of their employment, to go to the mill 
for an order of goods, such conduct did not consti-
tute an unfair labor practice within the meaning of 
the secondary boycott provisions. The union was 
there picketing the primary employer at his place 
of business and by no stretch of the imagination 
can that case he pertinent to the facts of the cause 
at bar. 
Appellants rely also upon the National Labor 
Relations Board's Schultz Refrigerated Service case, 
25 LRRM 1122, ruling, and we respectfully point 
out in that case tha:t, first, the picketing was Emi-
ited in time and area to the primary employer's 
trucks; second, the employees involved in the labor 
dispute were employed by the prim,ary employer to 
drive its trucks only in New York City; third, the 
employer at the time of the picketing was engaged 
in its normal business of transporting goods in that 
city; fourth, there was no other place in the city 
where the union could give adequate notice of its 
dispute with the primary employer; and fifth, there 
is no complaint of interference with :the business of 
secondary employers. 
One important test of 1awfulness of a union's 
picketing activities in the course of its dispute with 
an employer is the identificaJtion of such picketing 
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with the actual functioning of the primary employ-
er's business at the situs of the labor dispute. 
In the case appellants refer to as the Campbell 
Coal case (Sales Drivers, Helpers and Building Con-
struction Drivers, Local Union 859, of Internation-
al Br.'Jtherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America, AFL, Petitioner 
v. National Labor Relations Board, Respondent, 
229 F. (2) 514, 37 L.R.R.M. 2166) it will be noted 
that the case involved picketing at the sites shared 
by the struck employer and neutral employers. Our 
cause involves the picketing of Dairy Distributors' 
truck at the neutral employer's place of business 
to compel the primary employer, Cache Valley 
Dairymens Association to deal with the non-certi-
fied union. 
N.L.R.B. v. Service Trade Chauffeurs, etc., 191 
F. (2) 65, also relied upon by appellants, in fact 
holds: 
"The Union dearly violated the Act in 
picketing the Read Warehouse. For no trucks 
operated by the primary employer were pre-
sent at the warehouse, nor were any of its 
employees there engaged in the primary em-
p'loyer's business. The Board's findings, amply 
supported by the evidence, make it plain that, 
by this picketing, the Union induced Read's 
warehouse employees to engage in a concerted 
refusal in the course of their employment to 
perform their customary services - i.e., to 
quit work - and that they did quit, in part 
at least, because they were so induced by this 
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picketing. The Board was also clearly right 
in concluding that the objects of the Union's 
inducement were those prescribed by (a) and 
(b) of § 8 (b) ( 4) - namely, to force Read 
to cease doing business with the primary em-
ployer and to force the primary employer to 
recognize the Union as the representative of 
its employees, although the Union had not 
been certified as such a representative. 'To 
that extent, therefore, the Board's decision 
was correct and wirl now be enforced." 
Appellants also misconstrue the rule of the 
Moore Dry Dock case (Sailors Union of the Pacific, 
27 LLRM 1108). Appellants with reference to this 
case state: 
"2. 'At the time of the picketing the 
primary employer is engaged in its normal 
business at the situs.' When the Gossner truck 
was in front of Dorman's and being picketed, 
Gossner's employee was there too, and in fact 
did, engage in Gossner' s normal business of 
unloading cheese at that point. There is no 
evidence to the contrary." 
But, under the facts of this cause, it is clear 
that Dairy Distributors, Inc. was not the primary 
employer at the situs or at all and, also, that the 
picketing clearly discloses (from the signs them-
selves) that the dispute was clearly not with Dairy 
Distributors, Inc. but with the primary emplloyer 
Cache Valley Dairymens Association. We find no 
solace for appellants' cause in the authorities they 
cite. 
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The cases appellants cite to the court are excep-
tions to the general rule that picketing at the pre-
mises of secondary employers are violations of Sec-
tion 8 (b) ( 4) (A) are limited to the situation 
where the primary employer has no separate pre-
mises in the area of the labor dispute which affords 
the union an outlet for its primary activity. The 
rationa1le behind these exceptions is that unless the 
union w 2re permitted to carry its primary dispute 
to the neutral premises in these circumstances, its 
right to engage in primary activity would be vir-
tually obliterated. 
No sue~ justification for embroiling Dorman 
in respondents' dispute with Cache Valley Dairy-
mens Association exists here for Cache Valley Dairy-
mens Association has a regular place of business 
where the labor dispute is located, at which respon-
dents can engage in primary picketing. Thus, res-
pondents are unions which are located in, and whose 
jurisdiction is Utah; their labor dispute with Cache 
Valley Dairymens Association invo'lves employees 
who are hired in Utah; the terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees in question are fixed 
in Utah; and the services of said employees are en-
tirely performed in Utah. Moreover, as testified 
by 1the witness Thoresen, Cache Valley Dairymens 
Association has a regular plant and place of busi-
ness in Utah where respondents can engage in pri-
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mary picketing (and where such picketing has in 
the past effectively affected the ingress and egress 
of the trucks of four large common carriers doing 
business with Cache Val'ley Dairymens Associa-
tion). Thus, the situs of the dispute in this case is 
clearly located in Utah. This fact is a1so demon-
strated by the language on the several picket signs 
which were carried by respondents at Dorman's 
premises. 
Clearly, therefore, the facts of this case are 
distinguishable from the Schultz case, supra, where 
the dispute involved a New York union over deli-
veries in New York and where there was no place 
in New York other than the trucks of the primary 
employer which the Union could picket. It is also 
clearly distinguishable from the Moore Dry Dock 
case, supra, where the picketing union had no other 
place in lthe United States to picket. Here, the dis-
puting union has moved its picketing 2,200 miles 
from the situs of its dispute and from the area of 
its own jurisdiction, although it has adequate faci-
lities for primary picketing in the area where the 
dispute exists, and although it was unnecessary for 
it to do so in order to adequately appeal to the em-
ployees of Cache Valley Dairymens Association. As 
the Court of Appeals for :the Se'cond Circuit said in 
its very recent decision (November 3, 1955) in 
N.L.R.B. v. Associated Musicians of Greater New 
York et al., (Docket No. 23550) : 
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"It was clearly not necessary for the 
respondent union to picket the common pre-
mises in order to reach the other employees 
of the primary employer. At most three of 
these other employees worked at the common 
premises * * * wh:Ile some sixty-five (pri-
mary) employees were emp1loyed at the studio 
of WIN'S (the primary premises) , which res-
pondent union was picketing. Furthermore, 
·the few (primary) employees who ever went 
to the common premises spent a portion of 
their time at WINS and hence could be reach-
ed by picketing there." 
The Court concluded that the picketing of the 
common premises therefore violated Section 8 (b) 
( 4) (A). IT he Second Circuit's decision in the Asso-
c~ated Musicians case, supra, was an acceptance by 
the Court of the principle enunciated by the Board 
in Washington Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc., 107 
NLRB 299, and in other cases subsequent to Schultz 
and Moore Dry Dock which hold that common situs 
picketing cannot he engaged in where the prin1ary 
employer has a regular place of business in the area 
of the labor dispute at which the picketing union 
can engage in primary picketing. The Board's Wash-
ington Coca Cola decision was approved and enforced 
by the Court of Appeals in Brelcety and Beverage 
Workers Drivers v. N.L.R.B., 220 F. (2) 380 
(C.A. 4). 
'The most recent ruling to come to our atten-
tion, N.L.R.B. v. United Steel TVorkeJ's, Dec. 5, 
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1957, 1st Circuit, 250 F. (2) 184, is completely in 
accord with the foregoing authorities. There the 
court wrote: 
"The Board on exceptions filed by the 
Union agreed with the ultimate conclusion 
reached by the trial examiner but not with his 
reason therefor. Relying for its authority upon 
Brewery Drivers and Workers etc. (Washing-
ton Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc.) , 107 
N.L.R.B. 299, 302-303, enforced sub nom. 
Brew·ery and Beverage Drivers and Workers, 
etc. v. N.L.R.B., 1955, 95 U.S. App. D.C. 117, 
220 F. 2d 380; Local 657, International Bro-
therhood of 'Teamsters etc. (Southwestern 
Motor Transport, Inc.), 115 N.L.R.B. No. 
155; and Sheet Metal Workers International 
Association Local No. 51 ( W. H. Arthur) , 
115 N.L.R.B. No. 183, it said: 
" 'We agree with the 'Trial Examiner 
that the Respondents violated Section 8 (b) 
( 4) (A) of the Act by picketing the trucks of 
Barry, with whom the respondents had a 'labor 
dispute, at the termina1ls and the packaging 
plant of secondary employers on April 25, 
1956. In so doing however, we, unlike the 
Trial Examiner, do not rely upon the Res-
pondents' alleged failure to observe the Moore 
Dry Dock requirement that the picketing at 
_the secondary employers' premises be con-
ducted in a manner clearly disclosing :that it 
was directed only against the primary em-
ployer. Apart from the fact that we believe 
that the Trial Examiner's finding that the 
Moore Dry Dock standard was not met is fac-
tually incorrect, the Board has he1ld that the 
Moore Dry Dock doctrine is inapplicable to a 
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situation where as here the primary emplo:yer 
has a permanent place of business at wh1ch 
the union could adequately publicize its labor 
dispute. In these circumstances, we find, in ac-
cordance with the reasoning in Washington 
Coca Cola and Southwestern cases, that the 
fact that the picketing was conducted at the 
premises of secondary employers, plainly re-
veals that it was designed, at least in part, 
to induce and encourage the employees of 
these secondary employers to engage in a con-
cer:ted refusal in the course of their employ-
ment to handle Barry's freight with an ob-
ject of forcing or requiring the secondary 
em p1oyers to disc on tin ue doing business with 
Barry and that the Respondents thereby vi-
olated Section 8 (b) ( 4) (A) of the Act.' 
"We agree with the Board that the Moore 
Dry Dock doctrine, so-called, has no appli-
cation to the situation disclosed by the facts in 
this case. 
"That doctrine was devised by the Board 
to reconcile 'the dual congressional objectives 
of preserving the right of labor organizations 
to bring pressure to bear on offending em-
ployers in primary labor disputes and of 
shielding unoffending employers and others 
from pressures in controversies not their own.' 
N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building & Construction 
Trades Council, 1951, 341 U.S. 675, 692, 71 
S. Ct. 943, 9'53, 95 L. Ed. 1284. To effect this 
reconciliation the Board held as foHows (foot-
notes omitted) in a case involving the 
picketing of a vessel of a primary employ-
er tied up at a secondary employer's drydock: 
" 'When a secondary employer is harbor-
in the situs of a dispute between a union and 
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a primary employer, the right of neither the 
union to picket nor of the secondary employer 
to be free from picketing can be absolute. The 
enmeshing of premises and situs qualifies both 
rights. In the kind of situation that exists in 
this case, we believe that picketing of the pre-
mises of a secondary employer is primary if 
it meets the following conditions: (a) The 
picketing is strictly limited to times when 
the situs of dispute is located on the secondary 
emp1loyer's premises: (b) at the time of the 
picketing the primary employer is engaged 
in its normal business at the situs; (c) the 
picketing is limited to places reasonably close 
to the location of the situs; and (d) the pic-
keting discloses clearly that the dispute is with 
the primary employer.' 
"We may concede that the Moore Dry 
Dock doctrine would have application when 
the primary employer has a fixed and per-
manent place of business, but picketing his 
premises by striking employees would not in 
any real sense adequately publicize the labor 
dispute. 'The Board clearly recognized this in 
the language quoted above from its decision 
in the case at bar, such, apparent1y, was the 
situation in N.L.R.B. v. Service Trade Chauf-
fers, etc., 2 Cir., 1951, 191 F. 2d 65, and it is 
frequently the situation in the building con-
struction industry Where more often than not 
most of the employees of a contractor or sub-
contractor are working at a building site with 
employees of other employers and seldom, or 
only very briefly, have occasion to visit their 
employer's yard, warehouse, office or other 
headquarters. See N.L.R.B. v. General Driv-
ers, etc., 5 Cir., 1955, 225 F. 2d 205; Sales 
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Drivers, etc. v. N.L.R.B., 1955, 97 U.S. App. 
D.C. 173, 229 F. 2d 514, and its sequel Truck 
Drivers and He1pers Local, etc., v. N.L.R.B., 
D.C. Cir., 249 F. 2d 512. 
"The case at bar, hovrever, does not pre-
sent the foregoing situation, for here, so far 
as the record shows, all of the employees in 
the bargaining unit were continuously em-
ployed at Barry's manufacturing plant, ex-
cept Yorke and perhaps another truck driver 
with whom we are not concerned, and Yorke 
not only must frequently have had to cross 
the picket line at the Barry plant on his way 
to and from work, but he also had occasion 
in the course of his pickup and delivery duties 
to cross the picket line in his truck at least 
once or twice a day. Thus by picketing the 
premises of the primary employer, Barry, 
alone, the Union had a fully adequate oppor-
tunity to publicize its 1abor dispute to the 
members of the bargaining unit generally and 
also to exert individual pressure on Yorke by 
embarrassing him into either joining the 
strike or quitting his job. Certainly from these 
facts it was logical and reasonable for the 
Board to draw the inference that the Union's 
picketing of Yorke's truck at the premises of 
secondary employers must have been design-
ed, in part at least, to encourage those em-
ployers to cease doing business with Barry, 
or to induce their employees not to handle or 
transport Barry's freight. * * *" 
On the foregoing authorities, we submit that it 
is clearly reasonable to believe that respondents had 
and have no right to picket at Dorman's premises 
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in New York City and that such picketing is secon-
dary and vidlative of Section 8 (b) ( 4) (A) of the 
Act. 
POINT II. 
THE WESTERN CONFERENCE OF 'TEAMSTERS 
WAS A LABOR ORGANIZATION SUBJECT TO THE 
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT; THE 
COURT BELOW HAD JURISDICTION OVER WES-
TERN CONFERENCE OF TEAMSTERS AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL UNION. 
Appellants argue in Points II, III, and IV 
that no liability could be imposed on the defendant 
Western Conference of Teamsters or the Interna-
tional Union because the Western Conference is not 
a labor union and no jurisdiction by service of pro-
cess was obtained over either the Western Con-
ference or the International Union. We will discuss 
each of these propositions separately. 
In Point II the appellants quote the definition 
of a labor organization, which appears in Section 
II (5) of the Labor Management R~elations Act, 
and Section 152 ( 5) of Title 29, U. S. C. A. and 
F.C.A., and claim tha:t by this definition the Wes-
tern Conference is not a labor organization. The 
onily evidence in the record that it is not within the 
definition of the statute is the self-serving state-
ment of Joseph Ballew that the Western Confer-
ence is not a labor union (Tr. 149). The definition 
in the act, however, refers not to a labor union but 
a labor organization. 
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The definition referred to above says that a 
labor organization is "an organization of any kind 
or any agency or employee representation commit-
tee or plan, in which employees participate and 
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part 
of dealing with employers concerning grievances, 
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of em-
ployment, or conditions of work." 
Joseph Ballew testified that he was in Utah 
as an employee and representative of the Western 
States Dairy Employees Council, a division of the 
Western Conference of Teamsters (Tr. 141). Bal-
lew, by his own statement, was in Utah as a repre-
sen ta:tive of the Western Conference to assist local 
unions "in negotiation of contracts, disputes, or 
strikes over employees rights" (Tr. 142). Ballew 
also claims he was sent to Utah to assist in those 
duties and did assist the local union in Ogden, No. 
976 (Tr. 142). 
'There can _be no question that Ballew consulted 
and advised with local union officials, assisted in 
planning, preparation of picketing and the actual 
picketing in New York (Tr. 143). It seems clear 
that the orgainzation by which he was employed, 
the defendant Western Conference of Teamsters, 
existed in part a;t least for the purpose of dealing 
with employers concerning grievances, labor dis-
putes, and the other matters referred to in the defi-
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nition of a labor organization in Title 29, Sec. 152 
(5 ), U.S.C.A. The Court's attention is invited to the 
case of International Longshoremen's & Warehouse-
men's Union, Local 8 v. Hawaiian Pineapple Com-
pany, et al., a- Ninth Circuit Court decision, found 
at 226 F. (2) 875. In that case an action was 
brought by the Pineapple Company for damages un-
der the same section of the act which is the basis 
of this lawsuit. 'The defendant local and the inter-
nationa!l union claimed as a defense that the persons 
acting were not acting as agents for either the local 
union or the international. 
In answer to this contention the decision cites 
Sec. 185 (e) of Title 29, as follows: 
"For the purposes of this section, in de-
termining whether any person is acting as 
an 'agent' of another person so as to make 
such other person responsible for his acts, the 
question of whether the specific acts perform-
ed were actually authorized or subsequently 
ratified shall not be controlling. (June 23, 
1947, c. 120, Title III, #301, 61 Stat. 156) ." 
At page 880 of the opinion the following langu-
age appears as a construction of this section: 
"Probably the practica1 result of the sec-
tion in the case of labor unions was to restore 
the general rules of agency, particularly the 
rules of apparent authority which had been 
curtarled by the Wagner Act, 29 U.S.C.A. 
#151 et seq. and the decision of United Bro-
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therhood of Carpenters and Joiners of Am-
erica v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 67 S. 
Ct. 775, 91 L. Ed. 973. We think the section 
was intended to cover the acts of officers of 
the union who deal with employers or with 
the public. That is, if a union puts or lets 
an officer or other representative get into a 
position where he can and does cause trouble 
proscribed by the act then the union is re-
sponsible." 
It seems clear that Ballew on behalf of the 
Western Conference and for the Western Confer-
ence, as part of the International Union, was in 
Utah for the specific purpose of helping the local 
union and that he did so. The Western Conference, 
the local union in Ogden, and the International 
Union let its representative get into a position where 
he could and did cause trouble of the kind com-
plained of in this lawsuit and therefore, the local, 
the Western Conference, and the International are 
responsible for his acts under the statute and the 
decisions construing it. 
Under Point III, the appellants claim that no 
jurisdiction over the Western Conference could be 
obtained because it maintained no employees, no 
payroll, and had no knowledge whatever of the situ-
ation which gave r'ise to this lawsuit. 
The fact is that by his own statement Ballew 
was sent to Utah for the specific purpose of assist-
ing Local 976 in its dispute with the Cache Valley 
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Dairy Association (Tr. 142). His employer was the 
Western States Dairy Employees Council, a part 
of the Western Conference (Tr. 141, 142)-. The Wes-
tern Conference is by Ballew's assertion part of the 
International Union ('Tr. 143, 144). 
In Point IV of appellant's brief the same con-
tention is made about the International Union as 
for the Western Conference. The same testimony 
as to its connection with the activity complained of 
here is a pplicalYle. 
This same question of jurisdiction was con-
sidered in the case of United Mine Workers of Am-
erica v. Patton, 211 F. (2) 742, a 1954 decision of 
the Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit. 
This case was a damage action under the same 
section of the Taft-Hartley Act, Sec. 187 of Title 29, 
U.S.C.A., as is the basis of this lawsuit, and the 
violations claimed by the plaintiff were of sub-sec-
tions 1 and 2 of Sec. 187 (a) as in this case. 
'The opinion contains the following discussion 
of the question here raised by the appellants: 
"The chief argument of defendants in 
support of their motion for directed verdict 
is that there 'is no evidence that they author-
ized or ratified the strikes upon which plain-
tiffs rely for recovery. It is true that there 
is no evidence of any resolution of either the 
United Mine Workers or District 28 author-
izing or ratifying the strike.s. There is evi-
dence, however, that the strikes were called 
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by the Field Represen ta ti ve of the United 
Mine Workers, who was employed by District 
28, and that he was engaged in the organiza-
tion work that was being carried on by the 
internationa1 union through District 28, which 
was a mere division of the international 
union. Members of the union are members 
of local and district unions as well as the 
international ; and of the $4 monthly dues 
paid by them, $2 goes to the international 
union, $1 to the local union and $1 to the dis-
trict organization. It is clear that in carry-
ing on organizational work in the field rep-
resentative is engaged in the business of both 
the international union and the district and 
that both are responsible for acts done by 
him within the scope and course of his em-
ployment. Stockwell v. United States, 13 WaJll. 
531, 545-548, 20 L. Ed. 491; Hindman v. 
First Nat. Bk. of Louisville, 6 Cir., 112 F. 
931, 57 L.R.A. 108; Oman v. United States, 
10 Cir., 179 F. 2d 738; United States v. 
Waters, 7 Cir., 194 F. 2d 866; Jefferson 
Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Hedrick, 181 Va. 
824, 27 S.E. 2d 198; 2 Am. Jur. 279." 
In this case the witness Rash testified dues 
were paid to the local union and a per capita to the 
international union ( Tr. 116) . He further testified 
that Ogden Local 976 was in trusteeship; that Jack 
Annan of Los Angeles, California was the trustee 
appointed by the Executive Board of the Interna-
tional Union ('Tr. 121-12'3). 
In the Patton case, the union defendants argued 
that they should be exempt from liability because of 
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certain previous decisions construing the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. The Patton decision points out that 
the Taft-Hartley Act adopts a new rule exemplified 
by Sec. 185 of Title 29, U.S.C.A. The decision says 
as foHows: 
''It is clear, however, that the rule as so 
interpreted was not adopted by the Labor 
Management Relations Act and that its appli-
cation to suits under that act was expressly 
excluded by section 301 (e), 61 Stat. 156, 157, 
29 U.S.C.A. #185 (e), which provides: 
" 'For the purposes of this section, in de-
termining whether any person is acting as 
an "agent" of another person so as to make 
such other person responsible for his acts, 
the question of whether the specific acts per-
formed were actually authorized or subse-
quently ratified shall not be controlling.' 
"'The section of the Act under which this 
action is brought, 303 (b), 29 U.S.C.A. # 187 
(b), expressly provides that suits thereunder 
shall be subject to the limitations and pro-
visions of section 301, 29 U.S.C.A. # 185, as 
wili be seen by reference to the section which 
is quoted in full above. 
"The history of the Act shows clearly 
that the intent of Congress was to apply to 
suits of this character the common law rules 
with respect to liability for acts of an agent." 
Based upon an examination of the decisions 
construing the statutes here involved the special 
section on Agency (Sec. 185, Title 29, U.S.C.A.), 
and the testimony of Ballew and Rash, respondent 
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submits that jurisdiction of the Western Confer-
ence and the International Union was acquired and 
they cannot escape responsibility for the acts of 
their representatives. Certainly by no stretch of 
one's imagination could they be considered "strang-
ers to this action." 
POINT III. 
'THE CASE WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE 
JURY, WHICH WAS CORRECTLY AND ADEQUATELY 
INSTRUCTED. 
Points V, VI, VII and VIII of appellants' brief 
raise various questions and the discussion of these 
points is 'intended to apply to al1 of them. 
Among the matters raised is the admissibility 
of books and records of the plaintiff corporation. 
The appellants raised no objection when the 
records were offered, but said after an examination 
of the books and records an objection might be made 
(Tr. 68). No such objection was ever thereafter 
made and appellants cannot now complain about 
their being received as exhibits. They were received 
and sent to the jury. 
It should be pointed out that this suit was filed 
June 29, 1956, and not tried until October 23, 1957. 
Appellants made no attempt by subpoena, deposi-
tion, or otherwise, to examine the books and records 
introduced before the case was tried. 
Appellants cite the court to Eureka Hill Mining 
Company v. Bullion Beck & Champion Mining Com-
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pany, 32 Utah 236, 90 P. 157, a 1907 Utah case, 
as support for the claim that the books are inadmis-
sible as being incompetent evidence. 
The quotation from that case which appears in 
appellants' brief is from a Referee's Report quoted 
by the court. Further, it does not refer to business 
records which were admitted in evidence in that 
case, but to notations appearing on the original 
records. The original records were admitted. The 
case simply does not stand for the proposition for 
which the appellants cite it. 
The admissibility of business records under the 
so-called "shop...:book" rule has been the law in this 
state for many years. 
In Clayton v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany, a 1938 case, 85 P. (2) 819, a discussion of 
the rule as applicable to hospital records is set forth 
and says the following: 
We recogn'ize that the practice at com-
mon law in requiring the presence in court of 
the writer, or the identification of his hand-
writing, of each piece of writing, figure or 
notation introduced 'in evidence was too strict. 
·The shop-book rule, permitting the introduc-
tion of books of original en try made in the 
usual course of business and introduced from 
proper custody and upon general authenti-
cation, was a wise liberalization. This court 
has recogn'ized the shop-book rule. Welsh, 
Driscoll & Buck v. Buck, 64 Utah 579, 585, 
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232 P. 911; Utah Commercial & Savings Bank 
v. Fox, 44 Utah 323, 140 P. 660; Walker Bros. 
v. Sldiris, 34 Utah 353, 361, 98 P. 114; Ogden 
Packing & Provision Co. v. Tooele Meat & 
Storage Co., 41 Utah 92, 124 P. 333." 
This court has recognized and adopted in addi-
tion to the "shop-book rule" the "regular entry 
rule." In State v. Davie, 240 P. (2) 265, the opinion 
by Mr. Justice McDonough says: 
"The records referred to were properly 
identified by employees or attendants in the 
several offices as records kept in the regular 
course of business. While these records, as 
used in this case, do not, strictly speaking, 
fall within the 'shop book rule', they are ad-
missible for the same reasons which gave rise 
to that rule which has long since had the ap-
proval of this court. See cases listed in OlaytOn 
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 96 
Utah 331, 85 P. 2d 819, 120 A.L.R. 1117. 
They were correctly admitted in evidence un-
der what is called 'the regular entry rule.' 
32 C.J.S., Evidence, #683B, p. 554, states: 
'In addition to the shopbook rule, another very 
generally established rule, adopted by statute 
in some jurisdictions and sometimes spoken 
of as "the regular entry rule," is that regular 
entries made in the course of business * * * 
are admissilJle in evidence when a proper 
foundation is laid.' It is no longer necessary 
to have the person who made the records iden-
tify them. If he cannot be obtained as a wit-
ness, other employees who know the facts can 
do so. See 3'2 C.J.S., p. 554 referred to above; 
20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 1070. It is the 
prerogative of the trial court to determine 
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when such foundation is laid and sufficient 
showing of the credibility of the evidence is 
established. This requirement was met in the 
instant case." 
The business records introduced for the respon-
dent were properly identified by the witness Hansen, 
who made the entries. A proper foundation was laid 
to bring them within the "shop-book rule" or the 
"regular entry rule" (Tr. 64, 65, 66), and the trial 
judge was correct in receiving the exhibits offered. 
In the discussions under Points V, VI, VII and 
VIII, the appellants refer to Instruction No. 11 and 
apparently argue that it correcilly states the law 
on the subject. With this contention the respon-
dents agree and respondents also agree that in the 
absence of objection such an 'instruction becomes 
the law of the case. The submission of this instruc-
tion cannot possibly have prejudiced the appellants. 
'The claim is made by appellants that the proof 
is not sufficient to sustain the damages awarded 
because it permitted a result based upon specula-
tion. In support of this they refer to United States 
v. Griffith, et al, 210 Fed (2) 11. In this case the 
Tenth Circuit Court disallowed a judgment for loss 
of profits because of failure of the evidence to sup-
port the judgment. However, the only evidence of 
loss of profits was the oral statement of the presi-
dent of the plaintiff and no books or records were 
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ever produced. This case is certainly not authority 
for the proposition that lost profits cannot be re-
covered if proper evidence of such loss is introduced. 
The respondent contends that adequate and 
competent evidence was introduced in this case to 
sustain the verdict and the judgment thereon, and 
that the verdict was not based upon speculation or 
guess work. 
The question of recovery for loss of profits in 
the future was discussed in the case of United Mine 
Workers v. Patton, 211 Fed. (2) 742, which has 
been referred to earlier. The Patton case was an 
action for damages under the section of the Taft-
Hartley Act, the same section that is the basis for 
this action. In that case the plaintiffs acquired coal 
min'ing equipment and secured a lease on mining 
property from the Clinchfield Coal Company and 
conducted mining operations. The lease was later 
cancelled pursuant to its terms and the court in-
ferred because the union was attempting to make 
the plaintiff and other lessees employ union labor. 
The plaintiffs were tdld that they could renew the 
lease and thereafter could operate either with union 
or non-union employees. They began operations 
again on a non-union basis and were shut down be-
cause of a strike against Clinchfield and the strike 
against Clinchfield was the basis of the suit. The 
three year renewal lease was signed by Clinchfield 
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but vvas never actually delivered to the plaintiffs. 
The defendant union argued that no proper evi-
dence of loss of profits was submitted and that the 
judgment awarded plaintiff of $150,000.00 was 
speculative. With respect to this contention the court 
says at page 7 45 of the opinion as follows: 
"On the question of damages the evi-
dence is that plaintiffs purchased the equip-
ment of Moore for $25,000 paying only $10,-
000 in cash and the remainder on a tonnage 
basis as their mining operations went for-
ward. From March 1949 to March 1950 they 
returned net income as a result of the oper-
ations of approximately $47,000 and contend 
that the actual profits were in excess of $60,-
000. They introduced a witness who estimated 
'the profits for the remaining months of the 
three year lease at $125,27 4.92, based on the 
old operating costs and the current price of 
coal, and at $2'3'2,289.6'2, based upon reduced 
cost of operations considered possible. 
"On these facts we think that the case 
was one for the jury under Sec. 303 (b) of 
'the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 
Sta:t. 158, 159, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 187 (b)." 
Later in the opinion the court refers to the ques-
tion of speculation as to damages and says the fol-
lowing quoting Story Parchment Company v. Pater-
son Parchment Paper Company, a U. S. Supreme 
Court case: 
"Another argument is that no damage 
has been shown because it is said that the 
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three year lease had not been delivered and 
future profits of the business which p'laintiffs 
were forced to abandon were purely specula-
tive. We think however, that the evidence suf-
ficiently showed that plaintiffs had estab-
lished a profitable business under the ar-
rangement they had with Clinchfield, and that 
irrespective of the three year lease a suffi-
cient basis had been laid for an award of dam-
ages. As said by the Supreme Court in Story 
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper 
Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563, 51 S. Ct. 248, 250, 
7 5 L. Ed. 544, a tort case arising under the 
Sherman Act: 
'' 'Where the tort itself is of such a na-
ture as to preclude the ascertainment of the 
amount of damages with certainty, it wou1d 
be a perversion of fundamental principles of 
justice to deny all relief to the injured per-
son; and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from 
making any amend for his acts. In such case, 
while the damages may not be determined by 
mere speculation or guess, it will be enough if 
the evidence show the extent of the damages 
as a matter of just and reasonable inference, 
although the result be only approximate. The 
wrongdoer is not entitled to complain that 
they cannot be measured with the exactness 
and precision that would be possible if the 
case, which he a!lone is responsible for making, 
were otherwise.' 
''1See also Bieglow v. R.K.O. Radio Pic-
tures, Inc., 327 U. S. 251, 66 S. Ct. 574, 90 
L. Ed. 652, and Polar Steamship Corp. v. In-
land Overseas Steamship Corp., 4 Cir., 136 
F. 2d 835." 
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It is the position of the respondents that there 
was am p'le competent evidence on which the ques-
tion of loss of future profits should have been sub-
mitted to the jury and that the verdict returned 
was not based upon conjecture or speculation or 
guess work. 
)The claim is made by appellants that no dam-
ages could be recovered by respondent because he 
did not have a contract with the Cache Valley Dairy 
Association to buy, nor a contract with N. Dorman 
and Sons by which they agreed to purchase any 
particular amount of product from the respondent. 
There is no merit in this contention. No case 
has been found nor any rule of law which restricts 
recovery for loss of profits either in an action under 
the Taft-Hartjley Act or otherwise to those cases 
in which a contract is involved. 
Nothing in this record even suggests that the 
respondent would not have had a continuing source 
of supply. His source was one of the largest swiss 
cheese manufacturing plants in America. 
The record shows that the President of the 
respondent had been doing business with N. Dorman 
and Sons since 1946, and had conducted a growing 
volume of business with that company (Tr. 9). 
Victor Dorman testified that respondent was 
supplying 50 7o of the swiss cheese handled by his 
company (Tr. 277). 
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Louis Dorman testified that respondent was 
an important source of supply and he could not take 
the union's insistance that he find other sources 
"lying down." His statement is as follows: 
"A. Yes sir. Mr. Ballew and Mr. Rash 
and Mr. Ristuccia all joined in the conversa-
tion, pointing out to me why I shouldn't 
accept the cheese, and I explained to them 
that I certainly would be cooperative in this 
thing if it was of minor importance, but inas-
much as it was of so great importance to us, 
that we depended so much on it, I couldn't 
very wel1 just lie down and refuse to take the 
cheese." 
The evidence clearly shows that except for the 
conduct of the union and its representatives com-
plained of in this action respondent could have con-
tinued to do business with N. Dorman and Sons 
indefinitely in the same or greater volume. 
Appellant claims also that N. Dorman and Sons 
didn't stop buying from respondent because of pic-
keting. This just isn't the case. Victor Dorman told 
Gossner not to send any more cheese of Dairy Dis-
tributors, Inc. because his employees would not un-
load it. This was told Gossner orally and he was 
notified in writing. The following testimony was 
given by Gossner under cross-examination by Mr. 
Beck: 
"Q. Did you make any effort after you 
made the decision, or at the time you were I 
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making the decision to stay in business or 
to use your equipment, so you wouldn't be 
damaged so much, in other words to diminish 
your damages? 
"A. Well, I think I did. I have tried to 
convince the people back there to keep buying 
Dairy Distributors cheese, and I was told that 
Dorman employees would not unload any more 
that was Dairy Distributors cheese. 
"Q. Who told you Dormans wouldn't 
unload any more Dairy Distributors cheese? 
"A. The man I do business with back 
there, one of the Dormans said, 'Our emp[oy-
ees don't want to unload any more Dairy Dis-
tributors cheese, don't send any more with 
Dairy Distributors trucks.'" 
N. Dorman and Sons continued to do business 
with the Cache Valley Dairy Association, but not 
with the respondent Dairy Distributors, Inc. 
POINT IV. 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT PLAINTIFF 
WAS UNLAWFULLY ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE AND DEFENDANTS' CONTENTION TO 
THE CONT~ARY IS IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUES. 
Under-Points IX and X of appellants' brief it 
is contended that plaintiff shou1d be denied recovery 
because respondent was unlawfully engaged in in-
terstate commerce. This contention is without merit. 
Appellants set forth numerous sections of the 
Interstate Commerce Act, Title 49, Transportation. 
With all of the enumerated sections relied upon by 
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appellants we have no quarret Respondent's con-
tention is that he was a "private carrier" as defined 
by the Act. A private carrier is defined by the Act 
as: 
"The term 'private carrier of property by 
motor vehicle' means any person not included 
in the terms 'common carrier by motor ve-
hicle' or 'contract carrier by motor vehicle', 
who or which transports in interstate or for-
eign commerce by motor vehicle property of 
wnich such person is the owner, lessee, or 
bailee, when such transportation is for the 
purpose of sale, lease, rent, or bailment, or in 
furtherance of any commercial enterprise." 
(U.S.,C., p. 7180-81, Sec. 303 {17)). 
Under the Powers and duties of the Commis-
sion, it is declared: 
''It shall be the duty of the Commission-
* * * 
" ( 3) To establish for private carriers 
of property by motor vehicle, if need therefor 
is found, reasonalJle requirements to promote 
safety of operation, and to that end prescribe 
qualifications and maximum hours of service 
of employees, and standards of equipment. In 
the event such requirements are established, 
the term 'motor carrier' shall be construed 
to include private carriers of property by 
motor vehicle in the administration of sub-
section (c) of this section and sections 305, 
320, 321, 322 (a), (b), (d), (f), and (g), 
and 324 of this tifle." (U.S.C., p. 7182, Sec. 
304 {3)). 
There is nothing shown, proved or indicated 
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in the record in this cause to even suggest that the 
Commission has or should have exercised its author-
ity so as to invoke the provisions of Section 304 (c) 
which provides : 
"Upon complaint in writing to the Com-
mission by any person, State board, organiz-
ation, or body politic, or upon its own initia-
tive without complaint, the Commission may 
investigate whether any motor carrier or 
broker has failed to comply with any provi-
sion of this chapter, or with any requirement 
established pursuant thereto. If the Commis-
sion, after notice and hearing, finds upon any 
such investigation that the motor carrier or 
broker has failed to comply with any such pro-
vision or requirement, the Commission shall 
issue an appropriate order to compel the car-
rier or broker to comply therewith. Whenever 
the Commission is of opinion that any com-
plaint does not state reasonable grounds for 
investigation and action on its part, it may 
dismiss such complaint." (U.S.C. p. 7183, 
Sec. 304 (c)). 
Appel1ants do not and cannot contend that they 
or anyone else made complaint to the Commission 
or that the Commission upon its own initiative com-
plained against respondent for any failure to comply 
with any provision of the Transportation Act. For 
a lack thereof it must be presumed that your res-
pondent was at no time unlawfully engaged in inter-
state commerce. The record in fact shows that the 
Interstate Commerce Commission was aware of the 
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Dairy Distributors' trucking operation. Edwin Goss .. 
ner testified: 
"We have been checked by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and the National La-
bor since the Union put pressure on us the 
last few years we have had every agency I 
know of check our books and we have come 
out pretty clean with the Interstate Com-
merce Commission too.'' (Tr. 82). 
(This testimony was stricken from the record 
as not be'ing responsive and the jury instructed to 
disregard it, but it is the fact.) 
Cases relied upon by appellants, Stickle Co. v. 
Interstate Commerce Commission, (lOth Cir.), 128 
F. (2) 155; George Truck Systems, Inc. v. Inter-
state GDmmerce Commission, (5th Cir.) 123 F. (2) 
210; Scott v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 213 
F. 30, are not determinative of a course of conduct 
contended for by appellants which has never been 
adjudicated. 
POINT V. 
DEFENDANTS OFFER NO AUTHORITY FOR 
THEIR FURTHER CONTENTIONS, ALL OF WHICH 
ARE NOT MERITORIOUS. 
Without benefit of authority appellants claim 
error on the part of the trial judge for having re-
fused proffered testimony as to wages paid to cheese 
workers at cheese factories other than the Cache 
Valley Dairymens Association. 'The Court sustained 
an objection based upon the grounds that such evi-
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dence v1ould be irrelevant and immaterial to the 
issues and that no proper foundation had been laid 
for the admission of such testimony. The matter was 
considered in chambers ('Tr. 333, 334). It appears 
apparent that as to the cause of respondent, Dairy 
Distributors, Inc., the objection was well taken and 
properly sustained. 
Appellants also claim error in the admission in 
evidence of respondent's Exhibit P-4. The exhibit is 
a letter written to Edwin Gossner by Victor Dorman 
informing Gossner that the Union would not permit 
the unloading of Cache Valley Dairy Association 
cheese which had been shipped via "Mid-States" 
truck lines. The exhibit is certainly material to show 
a course of conduct on the part of the Union and is 
therefore and to that extent material to this cause. 
However, even if that were not so, we call this 
Court's attention to the fact that this letter was 
produced upon the insistence and demand of appel-
lants, the record shows : 
"Q. (By Mr. Beck). What was the 
reason Victor Dorman gave you- was this 
conversation over the telephone or in writing 
when he told you something about your cheese 
not being un1loaded? 
A. I have some of it in writing and 
some of it on telephone conversation. 
Q. Will you bring us the communica-
tions you have in writing? 
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A. I think I can. 
MR. BECK: Make sure of that Mr. 
Hanson, please." ('Tr. 91). 
Appellants further claim the Court erred in 
admitting respondent's Exhibit P-16 and say: 
"That Exhibit purports to be an audit 
of some of the books of plaintiff. The record 
fails to show whether the books claimed to 
have been audited were or were not received 
in evidence. That being so, it would seem self-
evident that the Exhibit was incompetent." 
(Brief of Appellants, p. 106). 
As to the books referred to by appellants here, 
the record shows : 
"MR. HANSON: We offer the Exhi-
bit in evidence, P-2. 
MR. ELIAS HANSEN: No objection 
at this time, we probably will after we inter-
rogate him further. 
MR. HANSON: The books are avail-
able and the books have been available since 
the suit started. 
MR. ELIAS HANSEN: 'Ve have no 
further examination of Mr. Hansen at this 
time. 
THE COURT: Do you have any cross 
examination? 
MR. ELIAS HANSEN: I may have a 
lot of cross examination after I examine the 
books." (Tr. 68). 
Appellants thereafter had the books for the 
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purpose of exa1nining them and the further inter-
rogation of the bookkeeper, Arnie Hansen, nowhere 
shows an objection to these exhibits ('Tr. 209-229). 
Appellants made full use of the exhibits. 
Finally appellants contend that the trial court's 
refusal to grant a new trial was further error. 
For all of your appellant's contentions under 
Points XI, XII, XIII and XIV of the Brief of Ap-
pellants, no authorities for such contentions are di-
rected to this Court's attention. 
CONCLUSION 
The verdict and judgment should be affirmed, 
costs to respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HAN'SON, BALDWIN and ALLEN 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorneys for PlJaintiff 
and Respondent 
65 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
